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Abstract
Drawing on a large sample of countries, this paper explores whether
closer economic ties between countries foster business cycle synchronisa-
tion and disentangles the role of the various channels, including trade
and ￿nancial linkages as well as the similarity in sectoral specialisation.
Overall, our results con￿rm that trade integration fosters business cycle
synchronisation. Similar patterns of sectoral specialisation also lead to
closer business cycle co-movement. By contrast, it remains di¢ cult to
￿nd a direct relationship between bilateral ￿nancial linkages and output
correlation. However, our results suggest that ￿nancial integration a⁄ects
business cycle synchronisation indirectly by raising the similarity in sec-
toral specialisation. Through this indirect link, ￿nancial integration tends
to raise business cycle comovement between countries.
Keywords: International transmission of shocks, Financial integra-
tion, International business cycle.
JEL Classi￿cation: E32, F41, E44.5
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The 2007-09 ￿nancial crisis led to a deep and synchronised global downturn,
accompanied by a severe contraction in international trade. It is widely held that
the unprecedented synchronisation of the downturn across countries is related
to the economic globalisation witnessed over the decades leading up to the crisis.
Globalisation has tied the countries more closely together in various ways.
To start with, globalisation has led to closer trade linkages across the globe.
Trade of goods and services as a share of world GDP increased from around
15% in the early 1980s to around 25% before the start of the crisis in 2007. In
parallel, ￿nancial integration has increased even more. Foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in particular has grown at rates far larger than those of trade or
output. From the early 1980s to 2007, the stock of FDI rose almost ￿vefold to
reach around 30% of world GDP. Furthermore, trade openness and international
￿nancial openness have been highly correlated across both industrial and devel-
oping countries. Countries that are more open to trade also tend to be more
integrated into global ￿nancial markets. While globalisation forces have made
countries more interconnected, structural di⁄erences of the various economies
might have also generated di⁄erences in business cycles. This calls for taking
into account the degree of similarity in the structure of production across coun-
tries when studying the factors underlying cross-country output correlations.
Against this backdrop, this paper explores whether closer economic ties be-
tween countries indeed foster business cycle synchronisation. Drawing on the
work by Imbs (2004 and 2006), we also seek to disentangle the role of the various
channels. More speci￿cally, we allow for a complex interplay between trade inte-
gration, ￿nancial integration and business cycle synchronisation. Cross-country
di⁄erences in production structure and their indirect connections with interna-
tional linkages are also taken into account.6
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Our paper adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, the analy-
sis rests on a relatively large sample of countries, including various emerging
economies, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Second, we use several
measures of ￿nancial integration, with one of the measures capturing bilateral
FDI linkages. This is a novelty in this branch of the literature and allows us
to assess whether the various types of ￿nancial integration have di⁄erent e⁄ects
on business cycle synchronisation. Third, to account for endogeneity problems,
we use various sets of instruments, particularly for ￿nancial integration. We
￿nd that some results turn out to be quite sensitive to the ￿nancial instruments
used. Finally, we assess how much the results depend on the country coverage
by repeating our empirical exercise for two di⁄erent sub-samples consisting of
the OECD countries and the EU Member States, respectively.
Overall, our empirical analysis shows that business cycle synchronisation is
mostly explained by the similarity in production structure and by trade linkages.
Financial linkages contribute to closer output correlations rather indirectly, by
making countries more similar. It seems worth noting that we de￿ne ￿nan-
cial linkages in a very narrow sense, i.e. in terms of bilateral asset holdings.
Therefore, we are unlikely to fully capture the ￿nancial transmission of global
shocks or shocks spreading through contagion e⁄ects via third countries. These
phenomena are likely to have played an important role in the remarkable syn-
chronicity of the downturn across countries that followed the 2007-09 ￿nancial
crisis, in addition to the channels described in this paper.7
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1 Introduction
The 2007-09 ￿nancial crisis led to a deep and synchronised global downturn,
accompanied by a severe contraction in international trade. It is widely held that
the unprecedented synchronisation of the downturn across countries is related
to the economic globalisation witnessed over the decades leading up to the crisis.
Globalisation has tied the countries more closely together in various ways.
To start with, globalisation has led to closer trade linkages across the globe.
Trade of goods and services as a share of world GDP increased from around 15%
in the early 1980s to around 25% before the start of the crisis in 2007. In parallel,
￿nancial integration has increased even more. Foreign direct investment (FDI)
in particular has grown at rates far larger than those of trade or output. From
the early 1980s to 2007, the stock of FDI rose almost ￿vefold to around 30% of
world GDP.1 These developments partly re￿ ect the increasing role of o⁄shoring.
Amador and Cabral (2009), for instance, ￿nd that vertical specialisation activi-
ties as a share of world manufacturing imports have risen signi￿cantly over the
past decades, with some acceleration over time. Furthermore, trade openness
and international ￿nancial openness have been highly correlated across both
industrial and developing countries. Countries that are more open to trade also
tend to be more integrated into global ￿nancial markets (IMF 2002).
While globalisation forces have made countries more interconnected, struc-
tural di⁄erences of the various economies might have also generated di⁄erences
in business cycles. This calls for taking into account the degree of similarity in
the structure of production across countries when studying the factors underly-
ing cross-country output correlations.
Against this backdrop, based on a sample of 56 countries, this paper explores
1These shares have been computed by the authors using di⁄erent sources. Values for world
trade of goods and services are from the WTO International Trade Statistics (2008). Values
for the world stock of FDI is from the UNCTAD World Investment Report (2008). Values for
world GDP are from the IMF World Economic Outlook (2009).8
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whether closer economic ties between countries indeed foster business cycle syn-
chronisation. Drawing on the work by Imbs (2004 and 2006), we also seek to
disentangle the role of the various channels.2 More speci￿cally, we allow for
a complex interplay between trade integration, ￿nancial integration and busi-
ness cycle synchronisation. Cross-country di⁄erences in production structure
and their indirect connections with international linkages are also taken into
account.
Overall, our results con￿rm that economic integration fosters business cycle
synchronisation. Above all, the GDPs of economies with more intensive bilat-
eral trade move more closely together. Apart from this, similarity in production
structure leads to closer business cycle comovements. By contrast, it remains
di¢ cult to ￿nd a direct relationship between bilateral ￿nancial linkages and out-
put correlation. Our results suggest that ￿nancial integration a⁄ects business
cycle synchronisation not directly, but acts more indirectly by raising the simi-
larity in production structure. Through this indirect link, ￿nancial integration
tends to raise business cycle comovement between countries.
Our paper adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, the analy-
sis rests on a relatively large sample of countries, including various emerging
economies, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. This might be espe-
cially relevant when considering the e⁄ects of vertical integration on business
cycle correlation. Second, we use several measures of ￿nancial integration, with
one of the measures capturing bilateral FDI linkages. This is a novelty in this
branch of the literature and allows us to assess whether the various types of
￿nancial integration have di⁄erent e⁄ects on business cycle synchronisation.
Third, to account for endogeneity problems, we use various sets of instruments,
2In addition to Imbs (2004, 2006), Abbott et al. (2008) also follow the same approach to
study the e⁄ects of trade, specialisation and ￿nancial integration for business cycle synchro-
nisation in 15 OECD countries. Similarly, Garcia-Herrero and Ruiz (2008) apply the same
methodology to business cycle synchronisation between Spain and a large set of economies.9
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particularly for ￿nancial integration. We ￿nd that some results turn out to be
quite sensitive to the ￿nancial instruments used, a point that deserves special
attention in future research. Finally, we assess how much the results depend
on the country coverage by repeating our empirical exercise for two di⁄erent
sub-samples consisting of the OECD countries and the EU Member States,
respectively. While we still have di¢ culties to ￿nd signi￿cant direct e⁄ects be-
tween ￿nancial linkages and output correlations for the OECD sample, these
e⁄ects become positive and signi￿cant for the EU sample.
Overall, our empirical analysis shows that business cycle synchronisation
is mostly explained by similarity in production structure and trade linkages.
Financial linkages contribute to closer output correlations rather indirectly, by
making countries more similar.
The remainder is structured as follows. The next section brie￿ y reviews
the related theoretical and empirical literature. Our empirical methodology is
described in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss the results, before concluding in
Section 5.
2 Literature review
Trade and ￿nancial linkages play a signi￿cant role in the international transmis-
sion of shocks and in business cycle sychronisation. However, empirical studies
and theoretical models have so far often produced con￿ icting results. While em-
pirical research has generally found that pairs of countries with relatively strong
trade and ￿nancial linkages tend to have highly correlated business cycles, the
theoretical models cannot deliver results that are quantitatively consistent with
such empirical ￿ndings.
Existing theoretical models studying business cycle synchronisation are mostly
based on the standard international real business cycle model. In a two-country10
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open economy model with complete ￿nancial markets, Backus et al. (1992)
show that, in a world of fully integrated asset markets, high trade intensity is
associated with lower business cycle correlations. Extending this model to ac-
count for vertical specialisation, Kose and Yi (2001) suggest that higher trade
integration might lead to more or less synchronisation, depending on the na-
ture of trade and the type of shocks hitting the economies. If higher trade
linkages foster specialisation, then the presence of industry-speci￿c shocks will
result in more idiosyncratic business cycles. By contrast, if higher trade link-
ages increase intra-industry trade (also in parts and components), then stronger
trade ties might lead to higher business cycle synchronisation. Other theoretical
models also show that intense bilateral trade tends to be associated with highly
correlated business cycles (Canova and Dellas, 1992).
While theoretical models support, to some extent, a positive relationship
between trade linkages and business cycle synchronisation, the impacts of ￿-
nancial integration on output correlations have remained unclear. On the one
hand, the ability to borrow and lend internationally facilitates the transfer of
resources between economies and can decrease output correlations. Backus et
al. (1992) show that, in a complete markets model, a positive technology shock
in one economy attracts capital ￿ ows from the rest of the world, resulting in
negatively correlated output ￿ uctuations. On the other hand, a model in which
individuals have incomplete access to international risk sharing instruments can
lead to opposite predictions, as Baxter and Crucini (1995) show.
Another explanation for business cycle comovement is the similarity in pro-
duction structure. In theory, similar production patterns should a⁄ect syn-
chronisation positively, since two economies producing the same types of goods
will then be subject to similar shocks. Thus, countries with similar production
patterns tend to have synchronised economic cycles.11
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Empirically, higher trade integration increases cross-country output corre-
lations (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Clark and van Wincoop, 2001). Also, most
empirical studies show a positive relationship between ￿nancial integration and
business cycle synchronisation (see for instance Imbs, 2004 and 2006). However,
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2009) argue that the positive assocation between ￿nancial
integration and business cycle synchronisation is mainly due to not accounting
for the e⁄ects of country-pair factors and global shocks. Using a rich panel data
set on banks￿international bilateral exposures over 30 years and 20 developed
countries, they are able to account for these factors and ￿nd a negative relation-
ship between ￿nancial integration and business cycle synchronisation. Finally,
concerning the similarity in production structure, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001)
and Imbs (2004 and 2006) all ￿nd that country pairs with similar production
structure exhibit closer output correlation.
Furthermore, interactions between integration and production structure have
to be taken into account. For instance, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) show that
￿nancially integrated economies tend to specialise in di⁄erent sectors, in line
with their comparative advantages. However, ￿nancial integration between two
economies could also increase the similarity of their production structures, as
foreign investment could be concentrated on similar activities, for instance those
dependent on external funds (Imbs, 2006). FDI ￿ ows could also be concentrated
on sectors where the home country has a comparative advantage, thus replicat-
ing in the host country a similar productive structure (Garcia-Herrero and Ruiz,
2008). The production structure might in turn in￿ uence the way trade and ￿-
nancial integration a⁄ect output correlations.
It is therefore important to consider all these linkages together. The method-
ology generally used in the literature to test for the relevance of trade and ￿-
nancial channels is the estimation of a single equation. The fact that there may12
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be indirect e⁄ects going in opposite directions might account for the generally
small impact found in studies using single equation regressions. For instance,
Kose et al. (2003), using a single-equation regression, ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of
trade on business cycle synchronisation, but a non-signi￿cant e⁄ect of ￿nancial
links on output correlations. To address the possibility of con￿ icting indirect
e⁄ects, Imbs (2004 and 2006) estimates a system of simultaneous equations to
take into account direct and indirect e⁄ects on the synchronisation of output.
He ￿nds that similarity in production structure has a sizable e⁄ect on business
cycles. Most of this e⁄ect directly re￿ ects di⁄erences in GDP per capita. Also,
economic regions with strong ￿nancial links are found to be signi￿cantly more
synchronised, even though they also tend to be more specialised.
3 Methodology
We follow Imbs (2004 and 2006) and estimate a system of equations relating
bilateral output correlations with measures of trade and ￿nancial integration
as well as the similarity in production structures. We present ￿rst the system
of equations that will be used in our empirical analysis. We then give details
about the data used and the various measures computed. Finally, we present
the estimation strategy.
3.1 Framework
Similarly to Imbs (2004 and 2006), we estimate the following system of four
equations simultaneously. Each observation corresponds to a country pair (i;j):
￿i;j = ￿0 + ￿1Ti;j + ￿2Fi;j + ￿3Si;j + ￿4I1;i;j + "1;i;j (1)
Ti;j = ￿0 + ￿1Fi;j + ￿2Si;j + ￿3I2;i;j + "2;i;j (2)13
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Si;j = ￿0 + ￿1Ti;j + ￿2Fi;j + ￿3I3;i;j + "4;i;j (3)
Fi;j = ￿0 + ￿1I4;i;j + "3;i;j (4)
Here, the four endogenous variables are the bilateral output correlation ￿,
the bilateral trade intensity T, an index S capturing the similarity between
country i and j;and the intensity of ￿nancial links between these two countries
denoted F. I1;I2;I3 and I4 denote exogenous variables. As shown by Imbs
(2004), the identi￿cation of the system requires di⁄erences between at least I2
and I3, as well as instruments for F.
Equation (1) is rather standard in the literature studying the empirical deter-
minants of cross-country GDP in the vein of Frankel and Rose (1998) and relates
bilateral output correlations to measures of trade and ￿nancial integration as
well as the similarity in production patterns. Equations (2) to (4) capture the
interaction of the endogenous explanatory variables, allowing us to disentangle
direct from indirect channels. The speci￿cations chosen are those used in Imbs
(2004 and 2006).3
3.2 Data
As in Imbs (2006), the dependent variable is the pairwise correlation of HP-
￿ltered GDP, computed here over 1993-2007.4
Regarding goods market integration, we also follow Imbs (2006) and
3Imbs (2004) estimates a similar system with ￿1 = 0 and Imbs (2006) imposes ￿2 = ￿1 = 0
and includes T as dependent variable in Eq. (4).
4Other ￿ltering techniques have also been used, including the asymmetric Christiano-
Fitzgerald ￿lter, the Baxter-King bandpass ￿lter and simple year-on-year log-di⁄erences. Re-
sults using GDP correlation coe¢ cients based on these alternative ￿ltering methods are not
reported here, but are very similar to those presented below and consistent with the main
conclusions of this paper.14
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(EXij;t + IMij;t)NY Wt
NY i;tNY j;t
: (5)
Here, EXij;t and IMij;t denote total merchandise exports and imports, re-
spectively, from country i to country j. Futhermore, NY Wt stands for world
nominal output, while NY i;t and NY j;t denote nominal GDP in country i and
j, respectively.
Turning to ￿nancial market integration, existing studies on the role of
￿nancial linkages in business cycle synchronisation focus on portfolio investment.
While we follow this approach, we also use FDI-related linkages as an alternative
measure of ￿nancial integration. FDI has drastically gained importance over
the last decade and may have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the international transmission
of shocks than portfolio investment. Bilateral FDI linkages are measured by
the sum of country i￿ s FDI positions in country j and j￿ s FDI position in i.
Information on FDI holdings (in US dollars) are taken from the OECD￿ s Foreign
Direct Investment Statistics. Since most countries report inward as well as
outward FDI holdings, we are able to expand the sample beyond the pairs
formed by the 30 reporting OECD economies. Analogously, portfolio investment
linkages are measured as the sum of bilateral portfolio investment positions
based on the IMF￿ s CPIS database, as well as a decomposition into three broad
sub-categories, namely short-term debt securities, long-term debt securities and
equity securities.








jsn;i;t ￿ sn;j;tj; (6)
where sn;i (sn;j) is sector n￿ s share in total value added in country i (j). The15
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total number of sectors is N. If i and j are completetly symmetric, then Sij = 0.5
We turn now to a description of the exogenous variables and instruments
used in our analysis. In the trade equation (2), I2 comprises standard gravity
variables: the bilateral distance between the countries￿capitals and two dummy
variables indicating, respectively, if the countries share a common border and
if they were part of a single jurisdiction in the past. All these measures are
provided by CEPII.
Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) ￿nd that the specialisation patterns depend on
income per capita and that this relationship is non-monotonous. As countries
become more a› uent, they ￿rst diversify their production, only to specialise
again when they pass a certain threshold. In line with Imbs (2004), we therefore
include in I4 both the bilateral (log) product of and the di⁄erence between GDPs
per capita. Both measures are assumed to be exogenous to S and are based on
UN data for 1993-2007.
The ￿nancial instruments are taken from a dataset by Schindler (2009),
which, in turn, is based on the IMF￿ s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrange-
ments and Restrictions (AREAER). Although the dataset features several mea-
sures of ￿nancial restrictions, we make use of two indices re￿ ecting, respectively,
overall ￿nancial restrictions and restrictions to FDI. In addition, we construct a
complementary index for restrictions on ￿nancial transactions other than FDI.
For all three indices, we employ two di⁄erent versions. The ￿rst version is a
simple average over the rules applicable to ￿nancial in￿ ows and out￿ ows in both
countries. In some cases, however, restrictions are not cumulative and only the
stricter rule is binding. The second version takes this into account and averages
only over the stricter set of rules, e.g. the maximum of outward restrictions in
5We use UNIDO data on gross value added for six broad sectors: Agriculture, hunting,
forestry, ￿shing (ISIC A-B); mining, manufacturing, utilities (ISIC C-E); construction (ISIC
F); wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels (ISIC G-H); transport, storage and commu-
nication (ISIC I); other Activities (ISIC J-P).16
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country i on the one hand and inward restrictions in country j on the other
hand.
We also use a number of control variables in the regressions to account
for the role of macroeconomic policy coordination. In particular, we include
dummy variables to control for common currency union (e.g. EMU) and for
trade aggrements (e.g. EU).
All in all, our full sample comprises 56 countries (see list in the Appen-
dix). Taking into account missing observations, we arrive at a maximum of 964
country pairs for the whole sample. This large country coverage is particularly
relevent to take third-country e⁄ects into account. The possibility that cycles in
two countries can be correlated only because both countries are integrated with
a third country is a clear bias in empirical studies with a small sample size. By
extending the number of countries, we reduce the probability that the results
are biased due to third-country e⁄ects as most of the relevant third countries are
likely to be included in the sample. By comparison, Imbs (2004) only consid-
ered 24 countries and Imbs (2006) included 41 countries in the sample. We also
consider two sub-samples to check the robustness of the results obtained with
the full sample and to assess whether the composition of the sample matters for
the estimation results. We ￿rst reestimate the system (1)-(4) over a sub-sample
of OECD countries and then by considering EU countries only.
4 Empirical results
The estimation of the system of equations (1)-(4) is realised along three di-
mensions. First, we estimate the system with di⁄erent measures of ￿nancial
integration (FDI, portfolio investment and its sub-components). Second, we
consider di⁄erent samples with regard to the country pairs included: the whole
sample, pairs of OECD economies and pairs of EU Member States. Third, as our17
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results are obtained by instrumenting ￿nancial integration by a new set of indi-
cators, we test the robustness of our results by using another set of instruments
that is widely used in the literature (based on La Porta et al., 1998).
4.1 Simple data analysis
We start with a very simple analysis of the data based on unconditional cor-
relations (Table 1). A few interesting results emerge. First, the correlation
between output correlations (￿) and its determinants (trade - T -, ￿nance - F
- and similarity - S -) is relatively high. For the whole sample, it is the lowest
vis-￿-vis trade integration (8%) and much higher vis-￿-vis the similarity in pro-
duction structure (20%) and ￿nancial integration (between 20 and 30%). While
the correlation between ￿ and S remains broadly unchanged whatever sample
considered, the correlations between ￿ and T and between ￿ and F is the highest
when we restrict the pairs to OECD countries. Second, the correlation between
trade and ￿nancial integration is overall rather low. However, when considering
FDI-based relationships, this correlation increases somewhat (standing between
10 and 20%). Third, there is a rather high correlation between the similarity
index S and ￿nancial integration F (between 30 and 45%), especially when F
is measured by portfolio investment. Finally, the correlation across the various
measures of ￿nancial integration is very high. However, while this correlation is
close to 90% between equity investment and debt holdings, it is somewhat lower
between portfolio and FDI-based measures, justifying our approach to estimate
the system with alternative measures of ￿nancial integration.
Overall, while this simple correlation-based analysis anticipates some of the
estimation-based results, it shows above all the complexity of the interconnec-
tions across the various channels that are at play in the transmission of cyclical
developments. It supports an empirical analysis based on a system of simulta-18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1322
April 2011
neous equations, as detailed above, given the potential for high and signi￿cant
indirect e⁄ects between output correlations and its various determinants.
4.2 Estimation results
To account for the possible endogenity of some dependent variables, we esti-
mate the system (1)-(4) with three-stage least squares (3SLS). 3SLS is used
when endogenous variables are correlated with error terms and the error terms
are correlated between equations. As argued by Imbs (2004), this procedure
is perfectly adapted to our needs, as it provides the features of simultaneous
equation methods and allows for the possible endogeneity of some dependent
variables.
Table 2 gives the 3SLS estimates of Eq. (1)-(4) for the period 1993-20076
and reports estimates with ￿nancial integration measured by various investment
types (FDI, portfolio investment and its sub-categories). Estimations reported
in Table 3 restrict the sample to OECD pairs, while Table 4 presents results
from estimations based on pairs of EU Member States.
Among the determinants of output correlations, trade integration and the
similarity in production structure are signi￿cant with the expected signs (Eq.
(1)). First, trade integration tends to foster business cycle synchronisation. This
is in line with the results of Frankel and Rose (1998), Clark and Van Wincoop
(2001) and Kose and Yi (2001). The value of the coe¢ cient ￿1 is higher when
restricting the sample to OECD or EU pairs. However, this coe¢ cient is found
insigni￿cant for EU pairs when F is measured by FDI or equity investment.
This result could appear surprising. In fact, in a similar exercise, Abbott et
al. (2008) identify a positive and signi￿cant relationship between trade inten-
sity and business cycle correlation for 16 European countries (when looking at
6Estimates on shorter sub-periods are available upon requests. They have not been included
in the present paper as they do not show large di⁄erences with the whole sample ones.19
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the individual-country results). However, one should keep in mind that the
EU Member States share relatively strong bilateral trade linkages. Restricting
the sample to these countries thus reduces the variance in the trade variable,
diminishing the precision with which the coe¢ cient ￿1 is estimated.
Furthermore, the coe¢ cient associated with similarities in sectoral structure
is in most cases negative, i.e. the more similar two countries are (low S), the
higher is the correlation of their outputs. This result is in line with Imbs (2006).
The coe¢ cient is slightly lower when the sample includes only OECD or EU
economies.
We generally cannot ￿nd a positive, signi￿cant relationship between bilateral
￿nancial linkages and business cycle correlation. This result is somewhat di⁄er-
ent from previous empirical research on ￿nancial integration (e.g. Kose et al.,
2003 or Imbs, 2006). In two cases only are we able to ￿nd positive, signi￿cant
values for ￿2: when F is measured using debt holdings and when the sample
is restricted to EU country pairs. We will discuss this issue in greater detail
below.
Concerning the indirect e⁄ects working through trade (Eq. (2)), the impact
of ￿nancial integration on trade is negative, as shown by the estimates of ￿1.
Thus, closer ￿nancial integration is associated with lower bilateral trade ￿ ows.
While Imbs (2006) had di¢ culties to ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects of ￿nance on trade,
we ￿nd signi￿cant, negative coe¢ cients whatever measure of ￿nancial linkages
used. These results indicate that ￿nancial integration might be a substitute
to trade integration. The value of ￿1 is higher when restricting the sample
to OECD countries. In addition, similarity in production structures increases
trade linkages (￿2 < 0), especially when F is measured by portfolio investment.
This ￿nding points to the importance of intra-industry trade in our data.
Finally, the indirect channels operating through sectoral structure (Eq. (4))20
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appear relevant. Trade linkages between two countries reduce the similarity in
their structure of production (￿1 > 0). Interestingly, this coe¢ cient is highest
when F is measured by FDI. However, this e⁄ect is not signi￿cant when re-
stricting the sample to EU country pairs. Again, this might be related to the
fact that the variance of the trade variable is lower in the EU sample. Also,
horizontal integration and intra-industry trade play an important role among
EU economies.
Concerning the e⁄ects of ￿nancial integration on structural similarity, the
sign of ￿2 is a priori ambivalent, as pointed out by Imbs (2006). Financial in-
tegration could either favour specialisation in di⁄erent sectors or rather foster
the concentration of activities in certain sectors, e.g. those dependent on for-
eign capital. Unlike Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001, 2003), we ￿nd ￿2 negative and
signi￿cant, whatever sample considered. Hence closer ￿nancial linkages are as-
sociated with greater similarity in production. The e⁄ect is particularly strong
for the OECD sample. One explanation could be that ￿nancial integration is
particularly important between advanced countries, which engage in a division
of labour in line with the rationale for intra-industry trade. Also, when F is
measured by FDI, the value of ￿2 is - in absolute terms - higher than when
it is measured by portfolio investment. This con￿rms the previous interpreta-
tion that sharing production processes increases the degree of similarity across





Overall, the results are broadly consistent with previous empirical evidence.
The only noticeable di⁄erence concerns the absence of a signi￿cant e⁄ect of21
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￿nancial integration on business cycle synchronisation. This result, which par-
ticularly contradicts Imbs (2004 and 2006), deserves some further investigation.
First, this result only concerns direct e⁄ects and there is a clear need to assess
the importance of indirect channels. This will be done in Section 4.3. Second,
the issue of endogeneity across the various explanatory variables appears impor-
tant when estimating the system. Instrumenting ￿nancial integration appears in
particular very critical in the estimation process. This issue is further discussed
in Section 4.4.
4.3 Disentangling the importance of the di⁄erent channels
The system of equations Eq. (1)-(4) allows for a complex interplay of direct
and indirect channels a⁄ecting business cycle synchronisation. Thus, the direct
e⁄ects suggested by Eq. (1) could be o⁄set by the indirect ones captured by
the remaining equations. To derive the overall impacts of trade and ￿nancial
integration as well as sectoral similarity, we combine the direct and indirect
e⁄ects, using the results from the simultaneous estimation. Tables 5 and 6
report the values for the indirect channels together with the overall e⁄ects when
F is measured with FDI and portfolio investment, respectively.7
[TABLE 5 HERE]
[TABLE 6 HERE]
To start with, we have seen that the direct e⁄ect of trade on output correla-
tions (￿1) is overall found to be positive and signi￿cant. Given the speci￿cation
of our system, indirect trade e⁄ects can only stem from interactions with sec-
toral similarity S. We already know that trade integration tends to reduce the
7Computatins based on estimates including F measured with equity and debt holdings are
available upon request.22
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similarity in production structure. As this in turn reduces output correlation,
the indirect trade e⁄ect of trade on business cycle synchronisation (￿3￿1) tends
to be negative, countervailing the direct impact. However, the overall e⁄ect
(￿1 + ￿3￿1) remains positive and signi￿cant. It is the highest in the OECD
sub-sample and in the EU sub-sample, when F is measured by portforlio invest-
ment. Only in one case, using the whole sample and measuring F by FDI, do
the indirect e⁄ects of trade cancel out the direct ones.
Turning to sectoral similarity S, our system allows only for indirect e⁄ects
through trade integration. As we have found that lower similarity tends to be
associated with lower trade linkages, this may reinforce the direct e⁄ect. How-
ever, the indirect e⁄ects are found small and insigni￿cant. Thus, the overall
impact (￿3 +￿1￿2) is fairly close to the direct one, con￿rming that higher sim-
ilarity in production structures leads to higher business cycle synchronisation.
The impact is the largest when estimating the system on the whole sample.
As already indicated, taking heed of indirect channels is particularly rele-
vant for ￿nancial integration. While we have not been able to ￿nd positive,
signi￿cant direct e⁄ects of ￿nancial linkages on output correlation, the indirect
e⁄ects are large enough to change the overall assessment. The ￿rst indirect
e⁄ect stems from interactions with trade integration. Since we have found that
￿nancial integration tends to reduce bilateral trade (and trade fosters output
correlation), this indirect e⁄ect could diminish the impact of ￿nancial linkages
on business cycle correlation. However, as shown in Tables 5 and 6, this indirect
e⁄ect is small and in most cases insigni￿cant. The second indirect e⁄ect oper-
ates through sectoral similarity. Our estimates show that ￿nancial integration
between two countries makes them more similar in terms of sectoral produc-
tion patterns. Sectoral similarity, in turn, tends to increase output correlation.
Thus, the second indirect channel creates a positive link between ￿nancial in-23
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tegration and business cycle synchronisation. It is large and signi￿cant, so that
the overall ￿nancial channel (￿2 + ￿1￿1 + ￿3￿2) is clearly positive and signif-
icant. It is specially large for the sub-samples including only OECD or EU
countries. In a nutshell, we ￿nd that ￿nancial linkages do not foster output
correlation directly, but indirectly, by increasing the similarity of the ￿nancially
integrated economies. Imbs (2006) also reports cases where lifting ￿nancial re-
strictions lowers S, i.e. where ￿nancial integration induces greater similarity,
which in turn increases the correlation of output.8 Estimating a similar system
for Spain, Garcia-Herrero and Ruiz (2008) also ￿nd a positive indirect e⁄ect of
￿nancial linkages on output synchronisation by fostering sectoral similarity, al-
though this indirect e⁄ect is not large enough to compensate the negative direct
e⁄ect between ￿nancial linkages and GDP synchronisation.
4.4 Sensitivity to the ￿nancial integration instruments
Our estimation strategy allows to deal with the possible endogeneity of the
dependent variables, using instruments to isolate the di⁄erent components of
the endogenous variables. While instrumenting trade or sectoral similarity is
fairly straightforward, ￿nding suitable instruments for ￿nancial integration is
more di¢ cult. Imbs (2004, 2006) uses institutional variables from La Porta et al.
(1998)9, arguing that legal institutions are important determinants of ￿nancial
developments. However, these variables do not so much relate to cross-border
￿nancial transactions, but to the local legal framework in general (including
rules for domestic investors). By contrast, the ￿nancial instruments used in our
benchmark estimations rely on measures of de jure restrictions on cross-border
8However, this result is not robust. Using other measures of ￿nancial integration, Imbs
(2006) also ￿nds results similar to Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001, 2003).
9These instruments re￿ect shareholder rights (with variables capturing whether one share
carries one vote, whether the distribution of dividends is mandatory, whether proxy vote by
mail is allowed, and the percentage of capital necessary to call an extraordinary shareholders￿
meeting), creditor rights, and an assessment of accounting standards and the rule of law.24
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￿nancial transactions, provided by Schindler (2009). Like several others (e.g.
Miniane 2004), Schindler (2009) draws on the IMF￿ s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), but provides information
at a more disaggregated level. In particular, measures of ￿nancial integration are
available for individual asset categories (e.g. equity, bonds, FDI). Furthermore,
the country coverage is fairly broad, ranging from low-income to high-income
countries.10 Both features of this set dovetail with our data requirements, while
its shorter time coverage as compared with other data sources is less important
to us.
To check whether the choice of instruments for ￿nancial integration might
in￿ uence the results, we re-estimate our system using - like Imbs - the set of
institutional variables taken from La Porta et al. (1998). This re-estimation
shows that the set of variables used to instrument F do matter, since - like in
Imbs￿work - ￿2 becomes positive for the OECD sample when using the variables
from La Porta et al. (1998) instead of those from Schindler (2009) (Table 7).
[TABLE 7 HERE]
However, the choice of the instruments does not fully explain the di⁄erences
between Imbs￿results and our ￿ndings, since the direct e⁄ects of ￿nancial in-
tegration remain insigni￿cant for the whole sample. In fact, the sampling also
seems to matter a lot to explain di⁄erences with the existing literature. In this
respect, our sample is much larger than the one used by Imbs. For instance,
Imbs (2004) uses a sample of 276 pairs and Imbs (2006) uses a maximum of
347 pairs. By contrast, our full sample comprises between 756 and 964 pairs,
depending on the speci￿cation. Using a much broader sample seems to in￿ u-
ence the results, especially when including countries with large di⁄erences in
development levels. Garcia-Herrero and Ruiz (2008) also obtain results that are
10The balanced panel covers 91 countries from 1995 to 2005 at annual frequency.25
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di⁄erent from Imbs using a sample that includes many emerging economies.
To summarise, the sensitivity of the results related to ￿nancial integration
with respect to the ￿nancial instruments used signals that future research should
pay special attention to this issue. It also puts another complexion on the results
of existing studies in this ￿eld. Similarly, the country coverage seems to be
relevant in some respects, indicating that the relationship between integration
and business cycle synchronisation might be di⁄erent for emerging and advanced
economies.
5 Concluding remarks
Drawing on work by Imbs (2004 and 2006), our empirial analysis has brought
some evidence about the role of trade and ￿nancial linkages in international
business cycle synchronisation. Overall, our results con￿rm that economic inte-
gration fosters business cycle synchronisation. Above all, the GDPs of economies
with more intensive bilateral trade move more closely together. Apart from this,
similar production structure lead to closer business cycle co-movement. By con-
trast, it remains di¢ cult to ￿nd a direct relationship between bilateral ￿nancial
linkages and output correlation. Our results suggest that ￿nancial integration
a⁄ects business cycle synchronisation not directly, but acts more indirectly by
raising the similarity in production structures. Through this indirect link, ￿-
nancial integration tends to raise business cycle comovement between countries.
The absence of direct link between ￿nancial linkages and output correla-
tion is in contrast with previous empirical studies. We have shown that this
result might be due to the choice of ￿nancial instruments used to account for
endogeneity. Moreover, the sensitivity of the results to the country coverage
indicates that the relationship between integration and business cycle synchro-
nisation might be di⁄erent for emerging and advanced economies. Finally, it26
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seems worth noting that we de￿ne ￿nancial linkages in a very narrow sense, i.e.
in terms of bilateral asset holdings. Therefore, we are unlikely to fully capture
the ￿nancial transmission of global shocks or shocks spreading through conta-
gion e⁄ects via third countries. These phenomena are likely to have played an
important role in the remarkable synchronicity of the downturn across countries
that followed the 2007-09 ￿nancial crisis, in addition to the channels described
in this paper. That said, our ￿ndings are in line with recent econometric stud-
ies on the 2007-09 ￿nancial crisis, which ￿nd no evidence that ex-ante bilateral
exposure can explain the di⁄erential impact of the global crisis on a large cross
section of countries (e.g. Rose and Spiegel, 2009). One explanation for this ￿nd-
ing might be that international ￿nancial integration fosters output comovement
between countries, even under limited trade and portfolio exposure, through
international correlation in credit spreads for instance (Dedola and Lombardo,
2010). We leave the empirical implementation of this idea to future research27
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Unconditional correlations




FFDI 0.30 0.10 1.00
FPF 0.25 -0.02 0.76 1.00
FEQ 0.19 -0.02 0.76 0.92 1.00
FDB 0.27 -0.00 0.73 0.97 0.84 1.00




FFDI 0.42 0.21 1.00
FPF 0.41 0.09 0.79 1.00
FEQ 0.35 0.05 0.80 0.95 1.00
FDB 0.35 0.12 0.75 0.98 0.88 1.00




FFDI 0.37 0.09 1.00
FPF 0.35 -0.09 0.80 1.00
FEQ 0.35 0.01 0.78 0.93 1.00
FDB 0.34 -0.13 0.78 0.99 0.89 1.00
S -0.25 -0.06 -0.32 -0.46 -0.41 -0.45 1.00
Notes: All variables measured in logs, except ￿. Variables are averages over 1993-2007. ￿
denotes bilateral correlations in GDP on the basis of HP ￿ltered annual data. T is the
measure of bilateral trade described in the text. FFDI, FPF, FEQ, FDB are the
measures of bilateral ￿nancial asset holdings based on respectively foreign direct investment,
portfolio investment, equity and debt holdings. S is the measure of similarity in production
structure described in the text.31
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Table 2: Estimation results - Whole sample -
Measure of F
FFDI FPF FEQ FDB
(1) GDP correlation
￿1 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02
(3.06) (3.24) (3.10) (1.69)
￿2 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02
(-1.38) (-1.20) (0.10) (1.82)
￿3 -0.23 -0.26 -0.22 -0.12
(-4.50) (-4.81) (-3.91) (-1.83)
(2) Trade links T
￿1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10
(-2.18) (-2.22) (-2.95) (-2.73)
￿2 -0.23 -0.37 -0.31 -0.38
(-1.55) (-2.59) (-2.01) (-2.14)
(3) Prod. struct.S
￿1 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.07
(4.56) (3.65) (2.84) (3.17)
￿2 -0.20 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12
(-8.42) (-9.31) (-7.36) (-7.92)
nb. obs. 853 964 756 814
Notes: All variables measured in logs, except ￿. Variables are averages over 1993-2007. ￿
denotes bilateral correlations in GDP on the basis of HP ￿ltered annual data. T is the
measure of bilateral trade described in the text. FFDI, FPF, FEQ, FDB are the
measures of bilateral ￿nancial asset holdings based on respectively foreign direct investment,
portfolio investment, equity and debt holdings. S is the measure of similarity in production
structure described in the text. All speci￿cations use 3SLS, with instruments details in the
main text. T-statistics in parentheses.
Equations:
(1) ￿i;j = ￿0 + ￿1Ti;j + ￿2Fi;j + ￿3Si;j + ￿4I1;i;j + "1;i;j;
(2) Ti;j = ￿0 + ￿1Fi;j + ￿2Si;j + ￿3I2;i;j + "2;i;j;
(3) Si;j = ￿0 + ￿1Ti;j + ￿2Fi;j + ￿3I3;i;j + "4;i;j:32
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Table 3: Estimation results - OECD sample -
Measure of F
FFDI FPF FEQ FDB
(1) GDP correlation
￿1 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(3.12) (4.46) (4.56) (3.87)
￿2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04
(1.03) (1.13) (1.54) (2.33)
￿3 -0.19 -0.17 -0.18 -0.13
(-3.13) (-2.50) (-2.52) (-1.94)
(2) Trade links T
￿1 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 -0.20
(-0.62) (-1.75) (-3.09) (-3.50)
￿2 -0.34 -0.60 -0.65 -0.93
(-2.00) (-2.94) (-3.53) (-3.93)
(3) Prod. struct.S
￿1 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.09
(4.43) (2.97) (2.15) (3.10)
￿2 -0.23 -0.15 -0.17 -0.16
(-6.74) (-9.16) (-8.04) (-8.30)
nb. obs. 416 421 391 393
Notes: All variables measured in logs, except ￿. Variables are averages over 1993-2007. ￿
denotes bilateral correlations in GDP on the basis of HP ￿ltered annual data. T is the
measure of bilateral trade described in the text. FFDI, FPF, FEQ, FDB are the
measures of bilateral ￿nancial asset holdings based on respectively foreign direct investment,
portfolio investment, equity and debt holdings. S is the measure of similarity in production
structure described in the text. All speci￿cations use 3SLS, with instruments details in the
main text. T-statistics in parentheses.
Equations:
(1) ￿i;j = ￿0 + ￿1Ti;j + ￿2Fi;j + ￿3Si;j + ￿4I1;i;j + "1;i;j;
(2) Ti;j = ￿0 + ￿1Fi;j + ￿2Si;j + ￿3I2;i;j + "2;i;j;
(3) Si;j = ￿0 + ￿1Ti;j + ￿2Fi;j + ￿3I3;i;j + "4;i;j:33
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Table 4: Estimation results - EU sample -
Measure of F
FFDI FPF FEQ FDB
(1) GDP correlation
￿1 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07
(1.05) (2.12) (1.54) (2.31)
￿2 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04
(2.91) (2.52) (1.52) (3.14)
￿3 -0.19 -0.21 -0.27 -0.15
(-2.64) (-2.61) (-3.49) (-1.74)
(2) Trade links T
￿1 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13
(-3.54) (-4.25) (-3.99) (-4.53)
￿2 -0.16 -0.06 -0.23 -0.53
(-1.04) (-1.29) (-1.49) (-3.21)
(3) Prod. struct.S
￿1 0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07
(0.92) (-1.29) (-0.60) (-1.28)
￿2 -0.13 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10
(-4.96) (-5.60) (-4.87) (-5.83)
nb. obs. 251 268 242 265
Notes: All variables measured in logs, except ￿. Variables are averages over 1993-2007. ￿
denotes bilateral correlations in GDP on the basis of HP ￿ltered annual data. T is the
measure of bilateral trade described in the text. FFDI, FPF, FEQ, FDB are the
measures of bilateral ￿nancial asset holdings based on respectively foreign direct investment,
portfolio investment, equity and debt holdings. S is the measure of similarity in production
structure described in the text. All speci￿cations use 3SLS, with instruments details in the
main text. T-statistics in parentheses.
Equations:
(1) ￿i;j = ￿0 + ￿1Ti;j + ￿2Fi;j + ￿3Si;j + ￿4I1;i;j + "1;i;j;
(2) Ti;j = ￿0 + ￿1Fi;j + ￿2Si;j + ￿3I2;i;j + "2;i;j;
(3) Si;j = ￿0 + ￿1Ti;j + ￿2Fi;j + ￿3I3;i;j + "4;i;j:34
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Direct (￿1) 0.05*** 0.07** 0.03
Indirect
via prod. struct. (￿3￿1) -0.03*** -0.04** -0.01
Overall (￿1 + ￿3￿1) 0.01 0.02* 0.02
Prod. struct. channel
Direct (￿3) -0.23*** -0.19*** -0.19***
Indirect
via trade (￿1￿2) -0.01 -0.02* -0.00
Overall (￿3 + ￿1￿2) -0.25*** -0.21*** -0.19***
Financial channel
Direct (￿2) -0.02 0.02 0.04***
Indirect
via trade (￿1￿1) -0.00* -0.00 -0.00
via prod. struct. (￿3￿2) 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.02**
Overall (￿2 + ￿1￿1 + ￿3￿2) 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Notes: The values are computed on the basis of the estimates reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4.
***/**/* denote signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.





Direct (￿1) 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.06**
Indirect
via prod. struct. (￿3￿1) -0.02** -0.01* 0.01
Overall (￿1 + ￿3￿1) 0.02* 0.06*** 0.07**
Prod. struct. channel
Direct (￿3) -0.26** -0.17*** -0.21***
Indirect
via trade (￿1￿2) -0.02** -0.04** -0.03*
Overall (￿3 + ￿1￿2) -0.27*** -0.21*** -0.24***
Financial channel
Direct (￿2) -0.01 0.02 0.03**
Indirect
via trade (￿1￿1) -0.00* -0.01* -0.01*
via prod. struct. (￿3￿2) 0.03*** 0.03** 0.02**
Overall (￿2 + ￿1￿1 + ￿3￿2) 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Notes: The values are computed on the basis of the estimates reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4.
***/**/* denote signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.35
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Table 7: E⁄ects of ￿nancial linkages on output correlation - Comparison with
alternative set of instruments
Instruments
Schindler (2009) La Porta et al. (1998)
Measure of F FFDI FPF FFDI FPF
Whole Sample
Direct (￿2) -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
Overall (￿2 + ￿1￿1 + ￿3￿2) 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.03***
OECD Sample
Direct (￿2) 0.02 0.02 0.05*** 0.04***
Overall (￿2 + ￿1￿1 + ￿3￿2) 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.05***
EU Sample
Direct (￿2) 0.04*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.02
Overall (￿2 + ￿1￿1 + ￿3￿2) 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.05***
Notes: FFDI and FPF are the measures of bilateral ￿nancial asset holdings based on
respectively foreign direct investment and portfolio investment. Direct and overall e⁄ects are
derived as for Tables 5 and 6. ***/**/* denote signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.36
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Appendix : List of countries
1. Whole sample (56 countries):
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Esto-
nia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indone-
sia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia,
Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Repub-
lic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
2. OECD economies (30 countries):
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Ko-
rea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States.
3. EU sample (25 countries)11:
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Repub-
lic, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
11For data availability reasons, Slovenia and Lithuania have not been included in the panel.Working PaPer SerieS
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